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ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
     William R. Russell, III, claims that he sustained total disability 
while employed 
by Corporate Property Investors, Inc. (CPI), as a real estate asset 
manager.  At the time, 
he was covered by both an individual policy for management employees and a 
group 
policy as an employee benefit plan.  Both policies included a disability 
benefit, each 
covering 40% of the employee's salary and each issued by the Paul Revere 
Life 
Insurance Company (the Insurer or Company).  As a result of an alleged 
disability, 
Russell ceased active employment and applied for disability status under 
both policies.   
 
     The insurer initially approved the benefits but about a year later it 
discontinued 
them on the ground that Russell no longer met the total disability 
definition of both 
policies.  Following denial of his claims and his appeals pursuant to the 
plans, Russell 
sued the insurer in the United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware pursuant 
to the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 
U.S.C. 
 1001-1461 seeking review of the insurer's denial of his claim for long-
term disability 
benefits.  The defendant insurance Company moved for summary judgment and 
the 
District Court granted the motion.  The plaintiff, Russell, timely 
appealed.  We affirm. 
 
                               I. 
     Russell alleged in his complaint that he was employed by CPI in March 
1990 as a 
Vice President and within the next two years became a participant in the 
Company's 
Individual Limited Plan and in its Group Limited Plan.  He further alleged 
that the 
defendant Company is a fiduciary of both plans with discretionary 
authority to determine 
eligibility for benefits.  As Vice President - Asset Manager, his duties 
included, inter alia, 
"overseeing a portfolio of commercial real estate properties located in 
the states of New 
Jersey, California, and Washington."  This, he claims, required him to 
travel from his 
office in New York approximately 25% of his time.  In his Statement for 
Disability 
Benefits to the Company, Russell stated that he applied approximately 25% 
of his 40 
hour week to coordinating the activities of various persons involved in 
the leasing and 
management of each property, and reviewing budgets, marketing plans and 
property 
appraisals for each property, including frequent travel to each property 
site.  He also 
indicated that he spent 10 to 15 hours per week coordinating the work of 
in-house and 
outside personnel associated with this effort.  Finally, he represented 
that about 5 to 10 
hours per week were allocated to financial analysis, mortgage financing, 
selling, or 
purchasing additional interests.  His claim designated his occupation as 
sedentary, which 
was defined as involving sitting, walking, or standing, and lifting 
objects between zero 
and 10 pounds.  The Company did not dispute Russell's characterization of 
his duties. 
     In March 1995, at age 37, Russell filed a disability claim with 
defendant 
requesting total disability benefits under the Group and Individual 
Limited plans.  Both 
policies essentially provide that an eligible employee is entitled to 
disability payments if 
"(1) because of injury or sickness, you cannot perform the important 
duties of your own 
occupation; and (2) you are under the regular care of a doctor; and (3) 
you do not work at 
all."  The Company approved benefits under both plans retroactive to April 
23, 1995.  
However, it ceased payment of the benefits under both policies on January 
16, 1996, 
concluding that Russell no longer met the definition of total disability 
under either of 
them. 
     In the District Court and in his complaint, Russell claimed that he 
suffers from a 
complex set of symptoms involving chronic pain in his back, chest, upper 
right 
abdominal quadrant, muscle and joint pain, as well as digestive symptoms 
involving 
frequent painful eructation. 
     The District Court applied an arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review with a 
high level of deference to the Administrator but modified to the extent 
that the deference 
was not absolute.   It therefore limited that review to the record before 
the Administrator.  
Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 433, 440 (3d Cir. 1997).  The 
Court also noted 
that because the Company was the Plan Administrator, it had a conflict of 
interest.  The 
Court, therefore, accorded the Administrator's decision "somewhat less 
deference." 
     Russell's claims to the Administrator were supported by written 
statements of his 
treating physicians, Dr. Frank Petito and Dr. Lucinda Harris.  Both opined 
that Russell 
was "continuously unable to perform in his/her occupation." Dr. Harris, 
however, in a 
letter dated April 5, 1996, stated that she believed he was "capable of 
doing sedentary 
office work that does not require any heavy lifting or any extensive 
travel."  She 
reiterated also that he suffers "chronic pain and believes him to be 
unable to do the level 
of work which he was doing prior to this chronic pain syndrome." 
     The language of both policies provides that the Company reserved the 
right to 
require "additional" or "continuing" proof of loss in order to continue 
paying benefits.  
The Company conducted a periodic review of the disability evidence, 
progress reports 
and activities check.  Based on this review, it ceased payment of benefits 
under both 
policies on January 16, 1996. 
     The January 16, 1996, Company letters terminating benefits advised 
Russell that 
it was "unable to determine any restrictions and/or limitations that would 
prevent [him] 
from returning to [his] sedentary occupation."  The Company specifically 
noted that 
Russell's complaints of "chronic abdominal pain, combined with periodic 
nausea; as well 
as frequent muscle and joint pain . . . and an inability to work long 
hours," coupled with 
the medical information submitted by his attending physicians and the 
activities check, 
do not support a finding of total disability.  The District Court agreed. 
     The District Court specifically found that the vast majority of the 
supporting 
claim documentation did not support a finding of total disability.  The 
Court found that 
the medical examinations consistently were unable to find a cause of 
Russell's symptoms 
and that most of the examination results were "negative" or "normal." 
Although the 
Court found that an objective view of all the medical evidence supported 
the conclusion 
that Russell suffered chronic pain prior to his resignation from CPI, it 
also believed that 
Russell's tests and examinations were "persuasively captured" in Dr. Rand 
Compton's 
letter of March 14, 1994, to Dr. Petito, stating in pertinent part: 
          Besides his pain, there are no symptoms or signs that suggest a 
disease 
     process.  All of the laboratory tests done here and elsewhere have 
been 
     completely normal, and given the chronicity of his problem, it is our 
     opinion that there is no significant pathology that can account for 
his pain 
     symptoms. 
 
Dr. Compton, an independent consultant of the Mayo Clinic, had previously 
written a 
letter dated March 11, 1994, stating that multiple CT scans, ultrasounds, 
and 
accompanying laboratory tests failed to reveal any pathology or 
significant abnormalities.  
Dr. Compton's associate, Dr. Bruce, made a similar assessment in April 
1994 in her letter 
to Dr. Petito, but stated that Russell was "quite fixed in his belief that 
he has a serious 
disease." 
     The District Court scrutinized the medical evidence presented by both 
parties, 
carefully analyzing the documentation of the treating physicians.  
Recognizing that Dr. 
Petito's overall assessment "would appear to support the finding of total 
disability," the 
Court also noted that Dr. Petito's report specifically referred to 
"extended hours" of work 
and "extensive travel" as the only important job duties that were 
precluded by Russell's 
"diminished" capacity.  The Court also concluded that Dr. Harris's opinion 
suggested a 
disabling condition requiring accommodation as opposed to a cessation of 
all job related 
activities.  Specifically noting that the opinion of Russell's attending 
physician should be 
given significant weight, the Court also considered the extensive body of 
medical 
documentation (70-plus documents) in support of Russell's claim.  The 
Court observed 
that the vast majority of this documentation provides no diagnosis for 
Russell's 
symptoms and does not support a finding of total disability.  Looking 
objectively at the 
medical evidence and the policy terms, the Court found it difficult to 
conclude that 
Russell was totally disabled from performing his duties as Real Estate 
Asset Manager. 
     In addition, the Court considered Russell's admitted level of 
participation in non- 
job related activities as inconsistent with a finding of total disability.  
Company- 
authorized surveillance of Russell's non-job activities revealed to the 
Court, as well as 
the Plan Administrator, that his hunting activities, although 
intermittent, required a level 
of exertion greater than that required by his important sedentary 
activities.  Further, 
evidence of his errand running, loading and unloading baggage of various 
sizes, 
attending computer classes of several hours duration, also raised doubts 
of the severity of 
Russell's disabling condition. 
     Finally, the Court did not find that at any one time Russell was 
precluded from 
performing all of his important duties as defined under the Individual and 
Group 
policies.  The Court concluded that an arbitrary and capricious standard, 
carefully 
administered, was not inappropriate and that under that standard summary 
judgment 
should be granted for the defendant Company. 
 
                              II. 
     On appeal, Russell challenges the Court's standard of review of the 
policies, 
arguing that the "discretionary language in the plan document that 
provides only an 
inferential discretionary basis to support an application of the use of 
deferential, arbitrary 
and capricious standard of review" should result in the use of a de novo, 
factual, and 
procedural analysis of the decision of the Plan Administrator.  He also 
argues that even 
under an arbitrary, capricious and deferential standard, the Plan 
Administrator's decision 
must be "reasonable," free of procedural errors, and supported by 
substantial evidence.  
Furthermore, he contends that where the insurer issues policies on which 
the disability 
determinations are made and the insurer actually makes the decision as to 
disability status 
and bears the costs thereof, there is a "structural conflict."   
     Finally, Russell asserts that there is ambiguity in the policy 
language with respect 
to disability benefits that mandates the use of the doctrine of contra 
preferentem as a rule 
of contractual interpretation.  This doctrine, he argues, requires the 
ambiguous terms of 
the policies "be construed most strongly against the drafter of the 
insurance policy." 
     The District Court acknowledged that, under ERISA, review of the 
administrator's denial of benefits is generally de novo review.  However, 
where the terms 
of the plan reserve to its administrator's discretion the determination of 
a claimant's 
eligibility for benefits, the administrator's decision is subject to 
review under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard this Court enumerated in Mitchell, 113 
F.3d at 437.  
Where the administrator's decision is confronted with a potential conflict 
of interest, as it 
is in this case, the Court opined that the conflict must be considered in 
issuing the degree 
of deference to be given to his decision. 
     In his exhaustive and carefully crafted opinion, District Court Judge 
Sleet first 
examined the discretionary language of the plan.  He noted that the 
Administrator's 
discretion to interpret the policy and determine the eligibility of 
applicants for benefits 
was reasonably inferred from the policy terms.  Moreover, Russell conceded 
in his 
amended complaint that the Company was a fiduciary under both policies 
"with 
discretionary authority to determine the eligibility of benefits." 
     Because of the conflict of interest of the Plan Administrator with 
its obligation to 
pay the benefits due a claimant under the policies, Russell urged the 
District Court to 
accord little or no deference to the Administrator's decision.  The Court 
acknowledged 
that a conflict of interest existed in this case and that a modified or 
heightened arbitrary 
or capricious standard of review was appropriate.  Applying this standard 
and examining 
the policies as a whole, the District Court reasonably looked at the facts 
to determine the 
appropriate amount of deference.  The Court concluded that Russell had to 
prove that he 
could not perform any of the important duties of his occupation.  In 
scrutinizing the 
policy terms, the District Court noted that among the terms of both 
policies were 
provisions for residual disability benefits.  They applied to insureds who 
can perform 
some of their occupational duties.   
     Taken as a whole, the Court appropriately concluded that these 
provisions 
disclose an expectation that the insured will continue to work in some 
capacity in his 
occupation unless the insured cannot perform any of the important duties 
of his job.  The 
Court therefore found, inter alia, that "the policy language places upon 
the employee the 
initial burden to demonstrate that he or she can not perform any of the 
important duties of 
his position." 
     Although Russell seems to acknowledge that he can perform some of the 
important duties of his occupation, he contends that if he is unable to 
perform one of 
those duties, he is totally disabled and entitled to benefits accordingly.  
However, the 
policies provide for full benefits upon total disability.  As for benefits 
on partial 
disability, they are not payable unless the insured is working.  Russell 
had resigned and 
was not working.  Russell had not provided any basis for the payment of 
full benefits in 
the face of evidence that he is able to perform some of the important 
duties of his 
occupation but elected not to work at all and spend his time in non-
occupational tasks.  
Turning to the Residual Disability section of the policies, the Court 
rationalized that it 
provided for an expectation that a partially disabled employee "will 
continue to work, in 
some capacity, in his or her occupation." 
     In support of the Administrator's decision that Russell was, at the 
most, only 
partially disabled, the Labor Market Report prepared by Pembroke 
Associates identified 
job opportunities in Russell's occupation in Wilmington, Delaware, that 
would relieve 
him of the extensive travel that he and his treating physician found 
unduly burdensome.  
The Plan Administrator had submitted the claimant's file to three 
independent consulting 
doctors, each of whom opined that Russell was capable of performing some 
of his 
occupational duties and work, at least on a part time basis.   
     The District Court also carefully considered Russell's argument that 
the decision 
of the Plan Administrator should be reversed because it committed 
procedural 
irregularities with respect to the surveillance tapes.  The District Court 
found that the 
Company "substantially complied with the requirements of the applicable 
regulations, 
and performed a 'full and fair review' commensurate with [the policies]."  
We agree. 
 
                              III. 
     In summary, the District Court gave thorough consideration to 
Russell's claims 
and arguments, including the conflict of interest on the part of the Plan 
Administrator.  It 
found that the conflict of interest did not unreasonably or improperly 
affect the 
Administrator's decision and that it complied with all of the applicable 
requirements.  
The court also limited its review to the evidence before the Plan 
Administrator.  This was 
appropriate.  Its failure to allow Russell to view the surveillance video 
tapes prior to 
filing his claim was insufficient to upset the determination of the 
Administrator as to 
preclude the award of summary judgment.  After reviewing the briefs, 
arguments, and 
pertinent portions of the record, we perceive no error on the part of the 
District Court.  




      
                              
TO THE CLERK: 
 




                                       /s/ Max Rosenn 
                                       Circuit Judge 
